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ANGOLA: NATION UNDER SIEGE
After weeks of media speculation about the substantive content of rumored negotiations between the Popular Republic of Angola ,
South Africa, and the Unit ed States, the three nations announced on February 16, 1984, that a ceasefire agreement had been reached .
South African troops would begin a phased withdrawal from occupied Angolan territory in exchange f or Angola 's commitment to
restrict SWAPO's activities within southern Angola , and the two countries would participate in a j oint commission to monitor the
disengagement process . The communique also provided that at the request ofthe parties, American representatives could play a role in
the activities of the commission, and the U.S . quickly moved to open a monitoring center in Windh oek, the Namibian capital.
Many supporters of African liberation and anti-apartheid activists have questioned the motivation behind Angola's decision to enter
talks with its long-time adversary, the value ofsuch an agreement between a radical Black nation and the illegitimate apartheid regime,
and the legitimacy of a U.S . role in the disengagement process.
This lSSUE BRlEF explores the circumstances surrounding Angola 's disengagement agreement with apartheid South Africa by
analyzing the external pressures and domestic obstacles confronting Angola . Th e analysis is preceded by an interview with Dr. Gerald
Bender, a noted American expert on Angolan affairs and an Associate Prof essor in the School of International Relations at the
University of Southern California at Los Angeles .

BENDER: One should not be totally cynical about what is
ANGOLA'S NEGOTIATIONS
WITH SOUTH AFRICA DO
NOT REPRESENT EVEN MINOR CHANGES IN EITHER
THE PRINCIPLES OR THE
MODUS OPERANDI OF THE
MPLA GOVERNMENT.

Gerald Bemler, Associate Professor, University of Southern California at Los Angeles.

transpiring. Doubtlessly , a significant change in atmosphere has occurred . Certainly, Assi stant Secretary of
State Chester Crocker and others-both inside and outside the administration-hope that this new atmosphere
will lead to positive conclusion of an agreement to send
Cuban troops home and to South Africa's implementation
of UN Resolution 435.
It is difficult to say, however, whether or not a new
change in atmosphere and environment will lead to that.
Clearly, things were going nowhere before. Now, with all
the parties talking to each other on a regular basis, the
time is more propitious for a settlement than before.
Nonetheless, one cannot assume that success is
imminent.

What significance should one attach to the negotiations
between Angola and South Africa?

Would the removal of Cuban troops necessarily mean that
the South Africans would implement UN Resolution 435?

BENDER: Certainly, these negotiations do not represent a

BENDER: The favorite game of "Southern Africa Watchers" is speculating on Pretoria's intentions in Namibia.
One of the things that makes this game both interesting
and difficult is the fact that it is not clear that Pretoria
knows what it wants to do . There are some signs that
down the road South Africa has laid further conditions
beyond Angolan agreement to remove the Cuban troops.
Some senior South African officials have suggested privately that they may require an agreement for an
MPLNUNIT A reconciliation before South Africa withdraws from Namibia. The Director of the Pretoria Strategic Studies Center has indicated that South Africa would
demand further conditions once the Cuban troops problem is solved .

breakthrough. Angola and South Africa have been holding direct, bilateral talks since 1976. The bottom line for
South Africa and the U.S. has always been that Angola
sign a calendar agreeing to a phased withdrawal of Cuban
troops. Until that calendar is signed, there will be no
implementation of UN Resolution 435 by South Africa.
That is understood in Washington and in Pretoria. Thus
far , there is no indication that the Angolans are prepared
to sign such a calendar given the present state of their
security concerns.
What changes, if any, are likely to occur in southern Africa
as a result of these negotiations?

The history of South African negotiations over Namibia
is filled with examples of excuses by Pretoria to hold up
negotiations. One day, they will stop offering excuses and
actually get out of Namibia. The question is whether that
is now or some time in the future.

Does Angola's willingness to negotiate with Pretoria reflect
any fundamental change in MPLA policies or principles?
BENDER: Angola's negotiations with South Africa do not

represent even minor changes in either the principles or
the modus operandi of the MPLA government. Talks between the two countries, which have become more public
in the last few years, have been conducted on an ad hoc
basis ever since Angolan independence in 1975. Certainly,
the agenda for these talks has broadened from solving
very concrete, specific problems to discussing much wider, less specific issues . The Angolan government has said
all along that it wishes to have normal relations with all
governments regardless of ideology, economic system, or
alignment as long as those governments respect Angolan
sovereignty. That includes the Soviet Union, the United
States, Cuba, and South Africa. The problem has been on
the South African side. The Pretoria regime does not recognize the government in Luanda, and has tried to destabilize-if not overthrow-that government both directly
and indirectly. It is difficult to carry on normal relations
with a neighbor that behaves this way. Therefore it is
perfectly reasonable for Luanda and Pretoria to talk with
each other as they are doing now. Both countries have
considerable mutual interests, and the first round of negotiations has advanced each country's interests. In this
case both countries win.
These talks do not affect Angola's relationship with
Cuba in any way , however. If this is a preliminary step
toward a settlement in Namibia that would ultimately lead
to a reduction in the number of Cuban combat troops,
then it would indirectly have some effect on Angola's
relations overall-not just with Cuba. I would assume that
the Cubans would be encouraging these negotiations, but
I doubt that Angola consulted Cuba. Angola knows its
best interests and would pursue them even if Cuba's perception were different. But I doubt that there is any difference on this issue.
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Does the current situation constitute evidence that the Reagan administration's policy of "Constructive Engagement"
is working?
BENDER: Well, it is too early to tell whether or not con-

structive engagement is working. It is certainly not possible to say that it has been successful. One needs to recall
that constructive engagement as spelled out is a policy
that says that in exchange for better relations with the
United States, South Africa had to make progress on two
fronts: one , move away from apartheid internally, and
two, accept UN Resolution 435 and get out of Namibia.
Now they certainly have received warmer relations and
material gains from the United States, as well as understanding and assistance in international forums and so
forth. The U.S. has delivered its side; what is not clear is
whether or not South Africa will deliver its side of the
bargain. On the South African domestic front , the key
change that has occurred since Reagan is the new constitution which brings Coloreds and Asians into the political
process. There are two ways to read that. Not unexpectedly, the Reagan administration reads that positively.
Those who oppose the administration's South African
policy, particularly constructive engagement, read it negatively, which of course is my own reading. Other than
that we have seen growth in repression and little indication that the South African government is closer to moving away from apartheid in 1984 than it was in 1981. So
constructive engagement has failed on one side-the
South African side-of the bargain.
Most attention has been focused on the Namibian side.
In fact many people seem to have forgotten about the
requirement to move away from apartheid. We cannot
claim successes at this point, and I am sorry to see that
Secretary of State George Schultz has claimed a breakthrough . He ought to know that there are many difficult
decisions down the road , the most important being the
question of the Cubans, over which there has been no
breakthrough.
Is there anything you want to add to sum all this up?
BENDER: It is disturbing to pick up an American newspa-

per like the Washington Times in early 1984 and see Holden Roberto described as a great Angolan leader, as a great
hope for Unjted States interests in Angola. One not only
has a feeling of deja vu with a character like Roberto reemerging, but also a heavy heart . It shows once again that
when Americans do take notice of Angola, it is often for
very selfish reasons that are detached from reality and
have little to do with the Angolan people's well being. I
fear that this new American attention to Roberto will do
the Angolan people more harm than good. That is one
reason why I personally hope that the present series of
negotiations will be successful. Hopefully , there will then
emerge a situation whereby with the withdrawal of the
South Africans , the Cubans and any others, Angolans will
for once be able to take charge of their own destiny.
□

RESTRUCTURING ANGOLA

While the process of social reconstruction is never
easy, the tasks which the Popular Republic of Angola face
are particularly complex.The elements of internal difficulties reflect the legacy of its 500-year history as one of the
most brutally exploited nations on the African continent.
Angola was the principal African supplier to the slave
trade, and that genocidal era has resulted in Angola currently being underpopulated. Although twice the size of
Texas and the second largest sub-Saharan nation, UN
officials have estimated its national population to be no
more than some seven million. Several of its governmental districts are virtually uninhabited, and the geographical isolation of various ethnic groups has inhibited the
development of national unity . The decimation of Angola's population makes adequate defense of its vast territory almost impossible and leaves the country vulnerable
to outside attacks and prolonged occupation.
As the least developed colonial power, Portugal was
forced to invite foreign multinational exploitation of its
colonies' resources . Most of the Portuguese settlers were
themselves illiterate and unskilled , so that even the most
menial jobs were traditionally filled by the newest arrivals, not Africans. Education was never a governmental
priority , so churches played a primary training role. No
more than 3 percent of the la9d was ever cultivated during
the colonial era when the agricultural sector was geared to
the production of export commodities, not nutritional
self-sufficiency. Coffee alone accounted for 34.5 percent
of all export income. Except for petty manufactures like
beer, soda, and processed food, there were virtually no
industries in Angola during colonialism, for the Portuguese settlers were content to use revenues from oil and
diamond exports to import almost everything. Foreign
multinationals were allowed to effectively administer
states within a state in their areas of control and establish
their own security regulations and labor practices. The
central colonial government did little but maintain an infrasructure that met the needs of foreign investors and
supervise the brutal contract labor system which allowed
investors in both the agricultural and industrial sectors to
reap great profits . Angola still suffers from the legacy of
Portugal's backward rule .
Upon winning independence in 1975, the MPLA government attempted to develop an industrial sector and to
end the country's reliance on imports, but has faced severe problems . Most of Angola's infrastructure was devastated during the anti-colonial struggle and subsequent
South African/UNIT A invasions . Since the Portuguese
had never allowed Africans to gain technical, managerial,
or administrative skills, the massive flight of Portuguese
settlers after independence left inexperienced Angolans
to cope with all the country's economic and security problems. Not surprisingly, diamond and on-shore oil production fell drastically in the years immediately following
independence and has not fully revived since then. However, by 1982 offshore petroleum drilling approached the
1969 maximum pre-independence levels. By that time,
however, falling world prices for Angola's primary exports had wiped out any advantages which might have
been recovered. Although Gabon and Nigeria are the only
sub-Saharan nations that produce more oil than Angola,
Angola's trade balance deteriorated from $471 million surplus in 1980 to a $5 million deficit in 1981. Although 1983
oil production rose approximately 30 percent, this gain
was partially offset by falling prices and the doubling of
long-planned investments in new oilfields and offshore

production. Since oil is the source for approximately 85
percent of Angola's foreign exchange and 65 percent of its
total government revenue, Angola's fate is tied to factors
far beyond its control.
In addition to its problems with the industrial sector,
and despite its meager populace, the Angolan government
has found it difficult to feed its people. Experts consider
only 8 percent of Angola's land to be even potentially
arable, and only 4 percent of the total available land is
now being utilized. While MPLA has made the production
of food a priority, its efforts have been thwarted at almost
every turn . The distribution of supplies and transportation
of produce to markets has been a perpetual problem, for
two thirds of all trucks within the country were driven off
and abandoned by the defeated settlers immediately after
independence, and 149 bridges were destroyed in the
South African invasion which followed. Although these
bridges had been rebuilt by 1980, recurring South African
invasions have prevented any reliance on their use, and
UNIT A forces continue to target the few remaining trucks
and bridges for sabotage. The Benguela railroad, the sole
cross-country rail link , has been another prime target. As
a result of these difficulties, provincial towns and capitals
are better stocked with food than the national capital of
Luanda. where population has doubled from the mass
exodus of peasants escaping the terrorism of UNITA and
South African forces. The drought which plagues the region has exacerbated this food crisis, and a rural population which could be capable of producing for the entire
nation now needs for itself the little it can produce. After
two successive years of drought, Angola has had to begin
bartering oil for food to supply the hard hit urban areas
where returning Angolan exiles and Namibian and Zairean refugees are clustered. Western analysts predict that
it will be at least 1990 before Angola will be able to achieve
iagricultural self-sufficiency , and even then only if export
earnings allow for the purchase of the materials needed
for food production.
However, these same analysts have also predicted that
any future rise in Angola's export revenues will be eroded
by pressure from past due creditors and increasing military costs. In 1981-1982, Angola had to reverse its traditionally cautious borrowing policies and double its debt
from 1.1 to 2.2 billion dollars to meet foreign currency
needs . For the first time, Angola entered the Euro-currency market but requested trade credits for imports, not
cash. Since the MPLA government was committed to
meeting the needs of all, not just those of white settlers,
domestic spending had been soaring and public expenditures had jumped 25 percent. By 1982-1983, various factors had forced the government to cut subsidies, end investments in new projects, and collect personal income
tax for the first time since 1976. Defense needs accounted
for nearly half of Angola's budget, and after the South
African invasions and occupations of August 1981 and
December 1983 , war needs were expected to continue to
take precedence over civilian concerns.
Despite this bleak picture, MPLA conducted the country 's first-ever literacy and vaccination campaigns, reopened provincial hospitals and imported the pharmaceuticals to supply them, established an indoor/outdoor
school system which operates in two shifts to meet demand , and developed a National Language Institute to
document and compile the indigenous Angolan languages.
All seem to agree, however, that Angola's economy will
remain depressed until and unless a solution to its security
D
problems can be found.

REAGAN WATCH: U.S. POLICY ON ANGOLA

While the legitimate national concerns of developing
nations have typically been subsumed under the strategic
concerns of U.S. policymakers, and Western aid was
knowingly utilized against the increasingly effective liberlrtion movements operating within each of Portugal's African colonies, Angola's national aspirations have been actively opposed by the U.S. government for at least
twenty-three years. Angola was the only Portuguese colo. ny with a range of strategic minerals as comprehensive as
those found in South Africa, and American firms had a
virtual monopoly over the extraction and production of
Angolan oil. By 1970, Angola was the world's fifth largest
diamond exporter, and the South African firm which controlled the Angola diamond industry had extensive U.S.
interests. Also at stake was NATO's strategic domination
of the south Atlantic Ocean, for Zaire virtually has no
coast; and world outcry over South Africa' s illegal occupation of Namibia suggested a challenge to the West's
continued use of Walvis Bay. Neither Portugal, South
Africa, nor the U.S. was prepared to lose access to Angola's resources, and each did its best to prevent Angola's
independence.
Between the end of the slave trade and 1961, the U.S.
had no specific policy towards Angola. By 1961 the U.S.,
already embroiled in the "Congo crisis," and alarmed by
Cuba's relationship with newly independent African nations, saw "communists" lurking behind every national
independence movement. Thus, when in 1961 the MPLA
launched the armed struggle phase of Angola' s anti-colonial struggle (after five years of non-violent protest
against Portuguese rule had been brutally repressed), the
Kennedy administration was primarily concerned not
with Angola, but with the East-West implications of another central African conflict. Although the U.S. responded to the development of an Angolan war of national liberation by publicly urging Portugal to prepare Angola for
eventual independence, the shift in diplomatic rhetoric
was actually an attempt to diffuse the world outcry over
the U.S. role in the assassination of Lumumba and to
portray the Kennedy administration as a friend of African
liberation. Despite the public proclamations of support for
Angolan independence, 1961 also marked the initiation of

CIA military and financial assistance to Angolan organizations considered susceptible to Western direction and
capitalist orientation. First to receive such aid was Holden Roberto , protege and brother-in-law of Mobutu, the
U.S. chosen leader for the Congo (now Zaire).
While covertly supporting Black movements that
would protect Western interests in the event of Angola's
independence , U.S . military and financial aid to Portugal
was-never more than briefly interrupted. Successive administrations trained and equipped Portugal's fighting
forces , shared anti-guerilla techniques developed by U.S.
troops in Vietnam, subsidized Portugal's war-strapped
economy, and supplied the toxic substances used in waging biological and chemical warfare against the civilian
populations of Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and
Mozambique. Though this logistical support was justified
by citation of NATO treaty obligations, the 1970 leak of
the "Tar Baby Memorandum" revealed the real foundation
of U. S policy to be the assumption that white settler regimes in southern Africa were "there to stay" and were
natural U .S. allies. The U.S. intelligence network seemingly was unaware, however, not only of the strength of
southern African liberation movements, but the extent of
anti-war sentiment within Portugal itself. Surprised when
a coup unseated Portugal's dictatorship in 1974 and the
new junta established mechanisms to hasten the errd of the
colonial period, the U.S. stepped up its campaign to ensure that a "moderate" government would assume power
in Angola, which had always been considered the "prize
jewel" of the Portuguese empire.
MPLA, the oldest Angolan liberation movement and
the only one with a truly multi-ethnic character, had always alarmed the U.S. with its capacity to effectively
govern and its anti-imperialist ideology. During the fourteen-year war of Angola's independence, the U.S. had
supported at least three other movements, each professing various ideologies and tribal loyalties but sharing the
CIA's goal of destroying MPLA. Roberto's FNLA movement claimed to seek the reformulation of the 14th century Bakongo kingdom through the unification of southern
Zaire and northern Angola. FLEC, the Front for the Liberation of the Cabinda Enclave, formed in 1963 after
MPLA opened a Cabinda front and sought the secession
of the province containing the greatest known source of
Angola's oil reserves . While FLEC never gained much
credibility, the CIA had greater success with UNIT A,
formed by dissident FNLA member Jonas Savimbi in
1966. UNITA, originally only a southern counterpart of
FNLA with the aim of uniting the Ovimbundu people of
southern Angola and northern Namibia, was a beneficiary
of massive CIA support and direct South African aid.
Despite this , a vast propaganda effort portrayed Savimbi
and Roberto as the leaders of authentic liberation movements and characterized MPLA as an elite movement of
intellectuals and "mulattoes." Mercenaries were recruited
from among the population of unemployed Vietnam veterans, and special appeals on behalf of FNLA and UNIT A
were made to the African-American community's PanAfrican sentiment. Covert aid to such insurgent forces

REAGAN WATCH (CONT.)

was at least theoretically ended on May 25, 1978, by President Carter; and a ban on covert action in Angola without
Congressional notification was later codified through the
Clark Amendment. However, since the inauguration of
the Reagan administration another movement, COMIRA
has been promoted in the Western press; and as late as fall
of 1983, a Newsweek cover story on the CIA listed Angola
as one of three African sites for U.S. covert action.
It was in 1966 that South Africa first launched air strikes
from its Namibian bases against MPLA-liberated zones,
and South African troops began to fight.alongside Portuguese combat troops. However, preoccupied by its own
war against Vietnam, a broad-based domestic anti-war
movement, and an African-American community that
was increasingly conscious of its ties to Africa, the U.S.
could ill afford to duplicate South Africa's direct support
of Angola's Portuguese settlers. On August 5, 1975, three
months before the scheduled date of Angola's independence, regiments of South Africa's regular army invaded
Angola under the pretext of protecting its hydro-electric
dam complex built in collaboration with the Portuguese
just inside the Angolan border. The U.S. was silent, but
arranged for an airlift of French, U.S., Belgian, and West
German arms to South Africa and UNITA, and FNLA
forces massed on the Namibian side of the Angolan border. MPLA repelled the South African invasion with the

aid of Cuban troops and established the Popular Republic
of Angola on November 11, 1975. The next month, the
U.S. government ordered Boeing to withhold delivery of
two planes worth more than $200 million- already paid
for by the MPLA government-and forced Gulf to cease
operations and withhold payments, thus causing Angola
to lose $1.5 million per day in foreign exchange. The U.S.
then vetoed Angola's first request for UN membership.
This pattern of South African aggression and U.S. hostility toward Angola has been clarified both by President
Reagan publicly supporting Savimbi and defining South
Africa as a friend of the U.S., and by South Africa's
citation of the U.S. invasion of Grenada as a precedent for
its invasion of Angola in December 1983.
The principle tenets of U.S. policy toward Angola have
remained distressingly consistent. Diplomatic, military,
and economic means once used to forestall the emergence
of a sovereign Angola are now utilized in an attempt to
destabilize Angola and hinder its economic development.
Both Democratic and Republican presidents have been
concerned solely with Angola's geopolitical significance,
mineral resources, and oil reserves, and Angola has become a model case for advocates of U.S. covert action.
The improvements in U.S. policy have been due to international public pressure , not from the recognition of AnD
gola's inherent right to self-determination.

Although successive U.S. administrations have railed against the continued presence of Cuban troops, the Reagan administra1ion
has taken the most belligerent attitude and has urged that the termination of South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia be linked to
the removal of Cuban troops from Angola. Periodically, media reports focus attention on the relationship between Cuba and Angola
and allude to supposed rifts between the two governments over new developments in the southern Africa region. Only rarely are the
Cuban and/or Angolan government's views directly presented. The following are translated excerpts from an official statement which
received little coverage by American media.

JOINT DECLARATION OF THE GOVERNMENTS OF CUBA AND ANGOLA
More than two years ago, the Governments of the Popular Republic of
Angola and the Republic of Cuba, in their joint statement of February 4,
1983 , divulged worldwide, expressed very clearly their principled position regarding the tense situation that prevails in the Southern Cone of
Africa.
The time elapsed has but confirmed the fairness of all aspects included
in the aforementioned statement, which has earned approval of international public opinion and has been welcomed by virtually all countries of
the World, with the shameful exception of the Governments of the
United States of America and South Africa , who have stuck for years to
the harmful formula of the so-called " linkage" that lacks any legal or
moral base and has been repudiated by everyone except their authors.
The Government of the Popular Republic of Angola has kept the
Government of Cuba fully informed of the details of the conversations
that is currently conducting with South Africa and the United States,
through which Angola seeks , based on principles, a negotiated solution
to the confict that over the years has confronted the Angolan people with
the South African aggressors , and to create conditions that will make
viable the immediate instrumentation of Resolution 435/78 of the United
Nations Security Council and the independence of Namibia.
Rigorously abiding by what is estahlished in the aforementioned joint
statement , the Governments of Cuba and Angola reiterate that they
would resume , by their own decision and exercising their sovereign will ,
the implementation of the gradual withdrawal of the Cuban internationalist military contingent , as soon as the following requirements are
fulfilled :
I. Unilateral withdrawal of the racists troops of South Africa from
Angoian territory.

2. Strict implementation of Resolution 435/78 of the United Nations
Security Council, access of Namibia to true independence and total
withdrawal of the South African troops that are illegally occupying that
country .
3. Cessation of all acts of direct aggression or threat of aggression
against the Popular Republic of Angola on the part of South Africa , the
United States of America and their allies.
Together with these three requirements it will also be an indispensable
condition, as was expressed by the Government of Angola through the
statement made by President Eduardo Dos Santos on August 26, 1983,
the termination of all assistance to the counter-revolutionary organization UNIT A and any other puppet group, on the part of South Africa , the
United States of America and their allies . ...
The Government of Cuba, on behalf of the Cuban people, pays due
homage to the heroism of the Angolan people, whom for almost a quarter
of a century have waged a liberation war. ...
The Government of the Popular Republic of Angola expresses the
unlimited gratitude of the Angolan people for the internationalist assistance that for two decades the Cuban people have provided to their
liberation struggle ....
Both Governments express their admiration and solidarity with the
heroic struggle that the peoples of Namibia and South Africa wage under
the leaderships of their sole a nd legitimate representatives , SW APO and
ANC , against the opprobious system of aparth eid, and they reaffirm
their conviction that this horrendous institution is historically con□
demned to disappear.
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